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Harden tensorflow-cloud CI workflow against token exfiltration. - #424
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Compromised tokens or untrusted CI dependencies can harvest over-privileged default workflow tokens persisted on the runner. - Restrict `actions.yml` permissions to `contents: read` and disable checkout credential persistence. PiperOrigin-RevId: 1020184809
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Harden tensorflow-cloud CI workflow against token exfiltration.
Compromised tokens or untrusted CI dependencies can harvest over-privileged default workflow tokens persisted on the runner.
actions.ymlpermissions tocontents: readand disable checkout credential persistence.