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3 changes: 3 additions & 0 deletions .github/renovate-tracked-deps.json
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@
".github/workflows/build.yml": {
"regex": ["mise"]
},
".github/workflows/generate-protobuf.yml": {
"regex": ["mise"]
},
".github/workflows/github-pages.yaml": {
"regex": ["mise"]
},
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6 changes: 6 additions & 0 deletions .github/renovate.json5
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
description: "Ignore internal project modules",
matchPackageNames: ["/^io\\.prometheus:(examples|example-.+|integration-tests|it-.+)$/"],
},
{
description: "Group protobuf-java and protoc together so generated code can be updated in one PR",
matchDepNames: ["com.google.protobuf:protobuf-java", "protoc"],
groupName: "protobuf",
separateMajorMinor: false,
},
],
customManagers: [],
}
64 changes: 64 additions & 0 deletions .github/workflows/generate-protobuf.yml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
@@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
---
name: Generate Protobuf

on:
push:
branches:
- "renovate/protobuf"
Comment on lines +4 to +7

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Note that a push for this from renovate could still theoretically contain untrusted code if the dependency being updated was compromised and a malicious version published.

If the update contained malicious code that tried to steal GITHUB_TOKEN (or whatever secret is used), it would able to perform arbitrary write operations on the repository, or whatever permissions that token had.

It's risky performing automated writes to the repository with elevated permissions in this context.

It's not something I've tried to do myself, but a safer approach could be to have this job only generate a Git patch for the changes as a build artifact, and then have another job/workflow take that artifact and apply it after applying some sanity checks (e.g. the diff only updates the expected files). Then any compromised code isn't able to actually execute with access to the secrets but the protobuf files can still be regenerated.


permissions: {}

jobs:
generate:
runs-on: ubuntu-24.04
permissions:
contents: write
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@de0fac2e4500dabe0009e67214ff5f5447ce83dd # v6
with:
ref: ${{ github.ref }}
# zizmor: ignore[artipacked] -- needs credentials to push
persist-credentials: true
- uses: jdx/mise-action@6d1e696aa24c1aa1bcc1adea0212707c71ab78a8 # v3.6.1
with:
version: v2026.2.11
sha256: 3e1baedb9284124b770d2d561a04a98c343d05967c83deb8b35c7c941f8d9c9a
- name: Cache local Maven repository
uses: actions/cache@cdf6c1fa76f9f475f3d7449005a359c84ca0f306 # v5.0.3
with:
path: ~/.m2/repository
key: ${{ runner.os }}-maven-${{ hashFiles('**/pom.xml') }}
restore-keys: |
${{ runner.os }}-maven-
- name: Verify both protobuf deps are updated
run: |
git fetch origin main
DIFF_POM=$(git diff origin/main -- pom.xml)
DIFF_MISE=$(git diff origin/main -- mise.toml)
if ! echo "$DIFF_POM" | grep -q 'protobuf-java.version'; then
echo "::error::protobuf-java not updated in pom.xml"
exit 1
fi
if ! echo "$DIFF_MISE" | grep -q 'protoc'; then
echo "::error::protoc not updated in mise.toml"
exit 1
fi
- name: Generate protobuf sources
run: mise run generate
- name: Commit and push generated sources
run: |
git diff --quiet && exit 0
UNEXPECTED=$(git diff --name-only | grep -v '\.java$' || true)
if [[ -n "$UNEXPECTED" ]]; then
echo "::error::Unexpected files changed:"
echo "$UNEXPECTED"
exit 1
fi
# Note: GITHUB_TOKEN pushes don't trigger CI re-runs.
# Close and reopen the PR to trigger CI after this commit.
# TODO: switch to PROMBOT_GITHUB_TOKEN once it's added to this repo.

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If PROMBOT_GITHUB_TOKEN has permissions greater than contents: write (e.g. if it had admin access) then that might be even riskier than using GITHUB_TOKEN regardless of whether it can trigger CI or not.

git config user.name "github-actions[bot]"
git config user.email "41898282+github-actions[bot]@users.noreply.github.com"
git add '*.java'
git commit -m "chore: regenerate protobuf sources"
git push
7 changes: 2 additions & 5 deletions mise.toml
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -31,11 +31,8 @@ description = "bare compile, ignoring formatting and linters"
run = "./mvnw install -DskipTests -Dspotless.check.skip=true -Dcoverage.skip=true -Dcheckstyle.skip=true -Dwarnings=-nowarn"

[tasks.generate]
description = "bare compile, ignoring formatting and linters"
run = [
"mise use --pin protoc@latest",
"./mvnw clean install -DskipTests -Dspotless.check.skip=true -Dcoverage.skip=true -Dcheckstyle.skip=true -Dwarnings=-nowarn"
]
description = "regenerate protobuf sources"
run = "./mvnw clean install -DskipTests -Dspotless.check.skip=true -Dcoverage.skip=true -Dcheckstyle.skip=true -Dwarnings=-nowarn"
env.PROTO_GENERATION = "true"

[tasks.test]
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