Report privately through GitHub Security Advisories. Do not open a public issue; a public issue is a disclosure.

Please include the affected version and platform, the impact you believe it has, and the smallest reproduction you can manage.

You should get an acknowledgement within 72 hours and an assessment within seven days. If a fix is warranted it ships in a patch release, and the advisory is published once the release is available. Credit is given unless you ask otherwise.

This project runs with the privileges of the process that starts it and reads whatever it is pointed at, so the interesting surface is where untrusted input crosses a boundary:

• The C hash engine (src/core). Memory safety is the whole game here: out-of-bounds reads or writes on adversarial input, and any divergence between the scalar, NEON, SSE2, AVX2, and AVX-512 paths. The paths are required to be bit-identical, and a difference between them is a bug worth reporting on its own.
• Path handling. Traversal outside a configured watch root, symlink following that escapes it, and TOCTOU between a change notification and the read that follows it.
• The IPC surface of the standalone daemon: unauthenticated access to the socket, or a message that crashes or hangs the daemon.
• Install-time code execution through the packages or their postinstall scripts.
• Denial of service that a watched directory can trigger against the watcher — unbounded memory from a pathological tree, or a wedge that stops events from being delivered.

• Resource exhaustion from deliberately pointing the watcher at an enormous tree with limits deliberately raised.
• Vulnerabilities in a dependency that already has a public advisory; those are handled by the audit CI job. Report them upstream.
• Findings that require an attacker to already have write access to the code being built, or to the machine running the watcher.