Port the v26.06.9 fixes to master

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -4,6 +4,56 @@ All notable changes to this project will be documented in this file.
 
 The format is based on [Keep a Changelog](https://keepachangelog.com/en/1.0.0/).
 
+## [26.06.9] - 2026-10-06: "Quantum-Resistant Lightning Channel VI"
+
+This point release is recommended for all users.
+
+### Added
+
+ - Releases now include signed reproducible arm64 and armv7 binaries for Ubuntu 22.04, 24.04 and 26.04.
+
+### Changed
+
+ - JSON-RPC: `blacklistrune` with `relist` needs a rune without restrictions when called through a rune, and refuses an `end` before `start`.
+ - JSON-RPC: `createrune` without a `rune` needs a rune without restrictions when called through a rune; any rune can still add restrictions to a rune it supplies.
+ - JSON-RPC: `listconfigs` shows `...` instead of the value of `wallet`, `recover`, `tor-service-password`, `bitcoin-rpcpassword` and the old `bookkeeper-db`, for every caller; unset ones are omitted.
+
+### Fixed
+
+ - JSON-RPC: `getroutes` with `maxparts=0` no longer crashes the askrene solver.
+ - JSON-RPC: a very large `datastore` value no longer crashes lightningd.
+ - onchaind: a channel closed by one of our own old commitments no longer crashes onchaind on every restart, and now resolves.
+ - currencyrate: reject non-finite prices from sources instead of hanging the RPC
+ - clnrest and wss-proxy: plugins now create TLS private keys with restrictive (0600) permissions regardless of umask.
+ - wss-proxy: now rejects messages larger than a BOLT8 wire message (65535 bytes) and caps concurrent connections.
+ - wss-proxy: an idle client no longer blocks the accept loop and prevents all new connections
+ - cln-bip353: fetchbip353 (and xpay payments to a human readable name) no longer hang when a remote endpoint stops responding
+ - lightningd: an incoming HTLC whose onion can't be parsed is now always failed as malformed, instead of crashing the node in some cases.
+ - channeld: a peer's `channel_reestablish` asking for a commitment it has already acknowledged now fails the channel instead of getting it re-signed.
+ - lightningd: an offered HTLC that reaches its deadline while the channel is shutting down now force-closes the channel, so forwarded funds cannot be lost to a late fulfill.
+ - askrene-getroutes: don't crash on invalid user input, source==destination
+ - lightningd: don't spuriously try to re-broadcast funding txs of already-confirmed channels on startup.
+ - Fix: SIGINT was ignored by the cln docker container
+ - Crash when trying to pay and you have recovered channel stubs in your peers list
+ - lightningd: a node recovering from a static channel backup no longer hangs up on the peer when one of the recovered channels has already closed, so the peer can still close the channels which are still open.
+ - invoice could omit warning_offline if created right after a peer disconnect
+ - macOS: channeld no longer dies silently with status 0 right after a channel open under load.
+ - macOS: fundchannel no longer fails or hangs with "Peer connection lost" when opening channels under load.
+ - plugins: a command whose id or method name needs JSON escaping no longer hangs.
+ - lightningd: a splice message for an inflight we don't know about now fails that channel instead of crashing the node.
+ - lightningd: `checkrune` no longer uses freed memory when a rune has several restrictions on the same parameter.
+ - protocol: reply to query_channel_range with channels ranges in correct block order
+ - channeld: no longer crash-loops when an HTLC that only the pre-splice commitment can carry is added during a splice-out.
+ - splicing: closing with a splice's commitment before any later commitment update can now time out or claim the HTLCs on it.
+ - lightningd: a valid rune missing from the database (e.g. after restoring an older backup) is recorded on first use, so its `per` and `rate` limits apply and its id isn't reused.
+ - connectd: ordinary gossip, pings and onion messages no longer count against the gossip query CPU budget, so busy nodes no longer throttle their peers.
+ - A channel peer can no longer crash lightningd by RBF-ing a splice into a transaction the node has already recorded.
+ - `setconfig` no longer permits config-line injection through persistent option values.
+ - channeld: when accepting a splice, we now enforce the negotiated feerate on the splice transaction, so a peer can no longer get us to sign a splice paying (almost) no fees
+ - 'checkrune': 'method/createrune' and 'method/blacklistrune' restrictions can no longer be bypassed with the 'invokerune'/'destroyrune' aliases
+ - runes: a rune with restrictions can no longer relist blacklisted runes.
+ - runes: a rune with restrictions can no longer create a new rune without them.
+
 ## [26.06.8] - 2026-09-19: "Quantum-Resistant Lightning Channel V"
 
 This point release is recommended for all users.

channeld/channeld.c

@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ static void billboard_update(const struct peer *peer)
 					       peer->depth_togo,
 					       num_channel_htlcs(peer->channel));
 
-	peer_billboard(false, update);
+	peer_billboard(false, "%s", update);
 }
 
 const u8 *hsm_req(const tal_t *ctx, const u8 *req TAKES)
@@ -1299,6 +1299,12 @@ static u8 *send_commit_part(const tal_t *ctx,
 			  remote_index, REMOTE,
 			  splice_amnt, remote_splice_amnt, &local_anchor_outnum,
 			  funding_pubkeys);
+	if (!txs)
+		peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
+				"Could not create commitment %"PRIu64
+				" for funding %s",
+				remote_index,
+				fmt_bitcoin_outpoint(tmpctx, funding));
 	htlc_sigs =
 	    calc_commitsigs(tmpctx, peer, txs, funding_wscript, htlc_map,
 			    remote_index, remote_per_commit, &commit_sig,
@@ -2051,6 +2057,23 @@ static NORETURN void splice_abort(struct peer *peer, struct inflight *inflight,
 	exit(0);
 }
 
+/* lightningd keys inflights by funding txid, so a splice tx which
+ * reuses the txid of one we already have (e.g. an RBF that rebuilt an
+ * identical tx) cannot be recorded.  Abort the splice rather than hand
+ * lightningd a duplicate. */
+static void check_duplicate_inflight(struct peer *peer,
+				     const struct bitcoin_txid *txid)
+{
+	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(peer->splice_state->inflights); i++) {
+		if (!bitcoin_txid_eq(&peer->splice_state->inflights[i]->outpoint.txid,
+				     txid))
+			continue;
+		splice_abort(peer, NULL,
+			     "Splice tx %s duplicates an existing inflight",
+			     fmt_bitcoin_txid(tmpctx, txid));
+	}
+}
+
 struct commitsig_info {
 	struct commitsig *commitsig;
 	struct secret *old_secret;
@@ -2215,6 +2238,12 @@ static struct commitsig_info *handle_peer_commit_sig(struct peer *peer,
 			  local_index, LOCAL, splice_amnt,
 			  remote_splice_amnt, &remote_anchor_outnum,
 			  funding_pubkeys);
+	if (!txs)
+		peer_failed_err(peer->pps, &peer->channel_id,
+				"Could not create commitment %"PRIu64
+				" for funding %s",
+				local_index,
+				fmt_bitcoin_outpoint(tmpctx, &outpoint));
 
 	/* Set the commit_sig on the commitment tx psbt */
 	if (!psbt_input_set_signature(txs[0]->psbt, 0,
@@ -3674,6 +3703,13 @@ static struct amount_sat check_balances(struct peer *peer,
 		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
 			      "amount_sat_less / amount_sat_sub mismtach");
 
+	/* feerate_per_kw must have been negotiated (accepter) or supplied by
+	 * the user (initiator) by this point: 0 would silently collapse the
+	 * fee floors below to zero and let a near-zero-fee splice through. */
+	if (peer->splicing->feerate_per_kw == 0)
+		status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
+			      "check_balances called with unset splicing feerate_per_kw");
+
 	min_initiator_fee = amount_tx_fee(peer->splicing->feerate_per_kw,
 					  calc_weight(TX_INITIATOR, psbt, false));
 	min_accepter_fee = amount_tx_fee(peer->splicing->feerate_per_kw,
@@ -3815,20 +3851,23 @@ static void update_view_from_inflights(struct peer *peer)
 	struct inflight **inflights = peer->splice_state->inflights;
 
 	for (size_t i = 0; i < tal_count(inflights); i++) {
-		s64 splice_amnt = inflights[i]->amnt.satoshis; /* Raw: splicing */
+		/* Each side's balance change on this inflight's commitment,
+		 * relative to the current funding: the same amounts
+		 * channel_txs() applies when it builds that commitment. */
+		s64 splice_amnt = inflights[i]->splice_amnt;
 		s64 funding_diff = sats_diff(inflights[i]->amnt, peer->channel->funding_sats);
-		s64 remote_splice_amnt = funding_diff - inflights[i]->splice_amnt;
+		s64 remote_splice_amnt = funding_diff - splice_amnt;
 
 		if (splice_amnt < peer->channel->view[LOCAL].lowest_splice_amnt[LOCAL])
 			peer->channel->view[LOCAL].lowest_splice_amnt[LOCAL] = splice_amnt;
 
-		if (splice_amnt < peer->channel->view[REMOTE].lowest_splice_amnt[REMOTE])
+		if (splice_amnt < peer->channel->view[REMOTE].lowest_splice_amnt[LOCAL])
 			peer->channel->view[REMOTE].lowest_splice_amnt[LOCAL] = splice_amnt;
 
 		if (remote_splice_amnt < peer->channel->view[LOCAL].lowest_splice_amnt[REMOTE])
 			peer->channel->view[LOCAL].lowest_splice_amnt[REMOTE] = remote_splice_amnt;
 
-		if (remote_splice_amnt < peer->channel->view[REMOTE].lowest_splice_amnt[LOCAL])
+		if (remote_splice_amnt < peer->channel->view[REMOTE].lowest_splice_amnt[REMOTE])
 			peer->channel->view[REMOTE].lowest_splice_amnt[REMOTE] = remote_splice_amnt;
 	}
 }
@@ -3935,6 +3974,7 @@ static void resume_splice_negotiation(struct peer *peer,
 		msg = towire_channeld_update_inflight(NULL, current_psbt,
 						      their_commit->tx,
 						      &their_commit->commit_signature,
+						      their_commit->htlc_signatures,
 						      inflight->locked_scid,
 						      inflight->i_sent_sigs);
 		wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));
@@ -4007,7 +4047,7 @@ static void resume_splice_negotiation(struct peer *peer,
 			    inflight->force_sign_first)
 		&& send_signature) {
 		msg = towire_channeld_update_inflight(NULL, current_psbt,
-						      NULL, NULL,
+						      NULL, NULL, NULL,
 						      inflight->locked_scid,
 						      inflight->i_sent_sigs);
 		wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));
@@ -4186,7 +4226,7 @@ static void resume_splice_negotiation(struct peer *peer,
 	if (recv_signature || send_signature) {
 		/* We let core validate our peer's signatures are correct. */
 		msg = towire_channeld_update_inflight(NULL, current_psbt, NULL,
-						      NULL,
+						      NULL, NULL,
 						      inflight->locked_scid,
 						      inflight->i_sent_sigs);
 		wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));
@@ -4392,6 +4432,8 @@ static void splice_accepter(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
 				 funding_feerate_perkw,
 				 accepted_feerate_max(peer));
 
+	peer->splicing->feerate_per_kw = funding_feerate_perkw;
+
 	/* TODO: Add plugin hook for user to adjust accepter amount */
 	peer->splicing->accepter_relative = 0;
 
@@ -4463,6 +4505,7 @@ static void splice_accepter(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
 	psbt_elements_normalize_fees(ictx->current_psbt);
 
 	psbt_txid(tmpctx, ictx->current_psbt, &outpoint.txid, NULL);
+	check_duplicate_inflight(peer, &outpoint.txid);
 
 	psbt_finalize(ictx->current_psbt);
 
@@ -4769,6 +4812,7 @@ static void splice_initiator_user_finalized(struct peer *peer)
 		     fmt_wally_psbt(tmpctx, ictx->current_psbt));
 
 	psbt_txid(tmpctx, ictx->current_psbt, &current_psbt_txid, NULL);
+	check_duplicate_inflight(peer, &current_psbt_txid);
 
 	outmsg = towire_channeld_add_inflight(tmpctx,
 					      &peer->splicing->remote_funding_pubkey,
@@ -4829,6 +4873,7 @@ static void splice_initiator_user_finalized(struct peer *peer)
 	outmsg = towire_channeld_update_inflight(NULL, new_inflight->psbt,
 						 their_commit->tx,
 						 &their_commit->commit_signature,
+						 their_commit->htlc_signatures,
 						 new_inflight->locked_scid,
 						 new_inflight->i_sent_sigs);
 	wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(outmsg));
@@ -5025,8 +5070,7 @@ static void splice_initiator_user_signed(struct peer *peer, const u8 *inmsg)
 	/* Save the user provided signatures to DB incase we have to
 	 * restart and reestablish later. */
 	outmsg = towire_channeld_update_inflight(NULL, inflight->psbt,
-						 inflight->last_tx,
-						 &inflight->last_sig,
+						 NULL, NULL, NULL,
 						 inflight->locked_scid,
 						 inflight->i_sent_sigs);
 
@@ -6246,9 +6290,20 @@ static void peer_reconnect(struct peer *peer,
 	 *       `commitment_signed`.
 	 */
 	if (next_commitment_number == peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 1) {
-		if (!recv_tlvs || !recv_tlvs->next_funding)
+		if (!recv_tlvs || !recv_tlvs->next_funding) {
+			/* They only revoke the previous commitment once they
+			 * have our last commitment_signed, so they can't need
+			 * it again.  And re-signing it now would use the
+			 * per-commitment point of the one after. */
+			if (peer->revocations_received != peer->next_index[REMOTE] - 2)
+				peer_failed_err(peer->pps,
+						&peer->channel_id,
+						"bad reestablish commitment_number: %"
+						PRIu64" but you already revoked %"PRIu64,
+						next_commitment_number,
+						peer->revocations_received - 1);
 			retransmit_commitment_signed = true;
-		else
+		} else
 			retransmit_commitment_signed = false;
 
 	/* BOLT #2:
@@ -6417,6 +6472,7 @@ static void handle_funding_depth(struct peer *peer, const u8 *msg)
 									      inflight->psbt,
 									      NULL,
 									      NULL,
+									      NULL,
 									      inflight->locked_scid,
 									      inflight->i_sent_sigs);
 					wire_sync_write(MASTER_FD, take(msg));

channeld/channeld_wire.csv

@@ -280,6 +280,9 @@ msgtype,channeld_update_inflight,7219
 msgdata,channeld_update_inflight,psbt,wally_psbt,
 msgdata,channeld_update_inflight,last_tx,?bitcoin_tx,
 msgdata,channeld_update_inflight,last_sig,?bitcoin_signature,
+# If last_tx is set, their HTLC signatures for it.
+msgdata,channeld_update_inflight,num_htlc_sigs,u16,
+msgdata,channeld_update_inflight,htlc_sigs,bitcoin_signature,num_htlc_sigs
 msgdata,channeld_update_inflight,locked_scid,?short_channel_id,
 msgdata,channeld_update_inflight,i_sent_sigs,bool,
 

common/json_stream.c

@@ -317,12 +317,12 @@ void json_add_hex(struct json_stream *js, const char *fieldname,
 {
 	/* Size without NUL term */
 	size_t hexlen = hex_str_size(len);
-	char str[hexlen];
+	char *str = tal_arr(js, char, hexlen);
 
 	if (!hex_encode(data, len, str, hexlen))
 		abort();
 
-	json_add_string(js, fieldname, str);
+	json_add_string(js, fieldname, take(str));
 }
 
 void json_add_hex_talarr(struct json_stream *result,

common/peer_failed.c

@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ peer_failed(struct per_peer_state *pps,
 				       desc,
 				       warn,
 				       msg);
-	peer_billboard(true, desc);
+	peer_billboard(true, "%s", desc);
 	peer_fatal_continue(take(msg), pps);
 }