feat: add cancel_authwit to Token, NFT and MultiToken - #36
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This was referenced Aug 19, 2026
Upstream-parity function present in every upstream reference token
contract but absent from all three of ours. Without it, a private
authwit that has been granted but not yet consumed cannot be revoked.
Ported verbatim from the upstream Token/NFT contracts (aztec-packages
v5.1.0):
#[external("private")]
fn cancel_authwit(inner_hash: Field) {
let on_behalf_of = self.msg_sender();
let nullifier = compute_authwit_nullifier(on_behalf_of, inner_hash);
self.context.push_nullifier_unsafe(nullifier);
}
Cancellation pre-emits the same authwit nullifier the consume path
emits, so a later authwit-gated call fails with a duplicate nullifier.
Three tests per contract: the negative case (cancel then attempt to
consume -> duplicate nullifiers), a positive control (same flow without
the cancel succeeds, attributing the failure to the cancel), and caller
isolation (a foreign account cancelling with the owner's exact inner
hash does NOT revoke the owner's authwit, since the nullifier is bound
to msg_sender). READMEs list the new function.
Additive: a new selector, no existing ABI touched.
Validated: token 84 / nft 64 / multitoken 80 Noir tests, aztec compile
OK. Codex adversarial review: safe and upstream-equivalent; its two
suggestions (tighten the negative assertion, add the caller-isolation
test) are applied — note its proposed error string 'already present'
was empirically wrong, the matchable revert is 'duplicate nullifiers'.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Contract: escrow
Contract: logic
Contract: multitoken
Contract: nft
Contract: token
Contract: vault
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Adds
cancel_authwitto Token, NFT and MultiToken. Every upstream reference token contract has it; none of ours did, so a private authwit that has been granted but not yet consumed could not be revoked.Ported verbatim from upstream (aztec-packages v5.1.0):
Cancellation pre-emits the same nullifier the consume path emits, so a later authwit-gated call fails on the duplicate.
Additive — a new selector; no existing ABI touched.
Tests (3 per contract, 9 total)
duplicate nullifiersinner_hashdoes not revoke the owner's authwit, proving themsg_senderbindingValidation
Full Noir suites: token 84 · nft 64 · multitoken 80.
aztec compileOK.Codex adversarial review: "safe and upstream-equivalent." Both of its suggestions applied. Note its proposed assertion string (
already present) was empirically wrong — that's the world-state DB log line; the matchable revert reason isduplicate nullifiers, verified by running.