From d80c3e73d181a22dbf21f04c327e1ef1aba3a80f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Antonio Sanchez <cantonios@google.com>
Date: Thu, 12 Nov 2026 09:19:37 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] Harden tensorflow-cloud CI workflow against token
 exfiltration.

Compromised tokens or untrusted CI dependencies can harvest over-privileged default workflow tokens persisted on the runner.

- Restrict `actions.yml` permissions to `contents: read` and disable checkout credential persistence.

PiperOrigin-RevId: 1020184809
---
 .github/workflows/actions.yml | 5 +++++
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)

diff --git a/.github/workflows/actions.yml b/.github/workflows/actions.yml
index f1c755fb..3fe79f33 100644
--- a/.github/workflows/actions.yml
+++ b/.github/workflows/actions.yml
@@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ on:
   pull_request:
     branches: [ master ]
 
+permissions:
+  contents: read
+
 jobs:
   build:
     runs-on: ubuntu-latest
@@ -14,6 +17,8 @@ jobs:
         python-version: [3.6, 3.7, 3.8]
     steps:
     - uses: actions/checkout@v2
+      with:
+        persist-credentials: false
     - name: Set up Python ${{ matrix.python-version }}
       uses: actions/setup-python@v2
       with: